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‘Notoriously Religious’ or Secularising? Revival and 
Secularisation in Sub-Saharan Africa
Stefan Paas
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam & Theologische Universiteit Kampen




In scholarly literature there is an ongoing debate about the definition and scope 
of secularisation. This article discusses the question of secularisation in Africa as a 
post-Christian phenomenon. Particularly, the role of recent Pentecostal revivalism 
in Sub-Saharan Africa is examined. After some clarification of terms and concepts, 
the historical relationship between (evangelical) revivalism and secularisation is pre-
sented. This template is then used to discuss recent potentially secularising trends in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The article concludes with some comparisons and suggestions for 
further research.
Keywords
secularization – Africa – modernization – revivalism – pentecostalism – 
evangelicalism – mission
1 Exceptionalism and Africa
In scholarly literature there is an ongoing debate about the definition and 
scope of secularisation. Part of this discussion is about ‘exceptionalisms’: is 
secularisation the rule or rather the exception in modernising countries? And 
if the classic European secularisation pattern is more or less the standard, why 
do some modernising nations not seem to secularise? For example, the United 
States was considered an anomaly for a long time, due to its highly religious 
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character. Then the debate turned: it seemed that modernising countries all 
over the world did not have any problems staying religious or even becoming 
more religious. Thus, secularising Europe became the exception.1 Now that the 
so-called ‘nones’ are on the rise in America, the tide may turn again. Be that as 
it may, the question remains: is secularisation a global and somehow inevitable 
phenomenon, or is it bound up with very specific historical and cultural condi-
tions obtained in (many) Western societies but far less in others?
To some extent the confusion is caused by the character of the term itself: 
what is called ‘secularisation theory’ is not a single theory, but rather a hotch-
potch of theories held together by the assumption that there is somehow a 
correlation between modernisation (societal differentiation, urbanisation, in-
dividualisation, technology, science, mass media, etc.) on the one hand and 
the decline of religion on the other.2 Since both ‘modernity’ and ‘religion’ are 
very heterogeneous terms, the secularisation debate is prone to host diverse 
and contradictory opinions. However, even when some clarity of definition is 
achieved the question of secularisation’s scope remains. While it is generally 
accepted that secularisation happens in the West, there is much less agree-
ment with regard to the so-called ‘Majority World’.3 As far as I can see, there are 
at least three general views.
The first view holds that secularisation is uniquely Western (or even Europe-
an). Thus, it seems that there is no necessary link between modernisation and 
secularisation. Secularisation is a cultural contingency, rooted in particular 
historical experiences that will likely not be repeated elsewhere. Peter Berger, 
for example, has revoked his general theory of secularisation by pointing out 
that the world is ‘as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more 
so than ever’.4 In his view, modernity does not necessarily lead to religious 
1   Cf. Peter L. Berger (ed.), The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Poli-
tics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999); Grace Davie, Europe: The Exceptional Case (London: 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002).
2   For a discussion of secularisation theories, and their relationship to missiological discourse, 
cf. Stefan Paas, “Post-Christian, Post-Christendom, and Post-modern Europe: Towards the 
Interaction of Missiology and the Social Sciences”, Mission Studies 28/1 (2011), 3-25. For 
a helpful historical approach, presenting different ‘schools’ in the secularisation debate, 
cf. Philip S. Gorski, “Historicizing the Secularization Debate: Church, State, and Society in 
Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ca. 1300 to 1700”, American Sociological Review 65/1 
(2000), 138-167.
3   The term ‘Majority World’ is sometimes used in preference to other terms such as ‘developing 
countries’, ‘third world’ or ‘the South’. It is considered as more neutral and accurate, as these 
countries do indeed contain the majority of humanity.
4   Peter L. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview”, in Descularization, 
ed. Berger, 2.
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decline; the West is and will likely remain an exception to the general rule. This 
view sits well with assertions such as that ‘Africans are notoriously religious’ 
(John Mbiti).5 Thus, recently it has been argued that ‘Africans have embraced a 
scientific worldview in some ways, but that has not diminished their religious 
explanations about the social world. (…) Unlike in other parts of the world, 
Africans remain overwhelmingly religious without signs of waning’.6
The second view asserts that secularisation is a universal phenomenon, 
or, in other words, that the conditions which gave rise to secularisation in 
the West will probably occur in other parts of the world as well, and with the 
same consequences. Steve Bruce, for example, believes that secularisation will 
and does happen in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, now that these societies 
become influenced by industrialisation, urbanisation, technology, consumer-
ism and individualisation. There is an unmistakeable link between (certain 
aspects of) modernity and secularity and temporary religious upsurges are 
no evidence against it. On the contrary, religious revivals, far from being its 
refutation, in fact confirm the secularisation thesis. According to Bruce, reviv-
als make modernity more palatable for believers by ‘disguising the extent of 
change with some old language’, and thus ‘providing easy steps away from the 
old orthodoxies’.7 From this perspective, it is no surprise to see one observer 
claim that ‘secularism is rapidly becoming a more generalised phenomenon in 
the African continent, spreading from a small circle of privileged individuals to 
a whole society undergoing a spectacular evolution’.8
The third view agrees with the second view that there is indeed a link be-
tween modernisation and secularisation, but as modernisation is a complex 
phenomenon secularisation will assume different characteristics in different 
5   John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (London: Heinemann, 1969), 1. Recently, 
Mbiti repeated his statement in a somewhat different version: ‘Almost by nature Africans 
are deeply religious’ (“Main Features of Twenty-First Century Christianity in Africa”, Mis-
sio Africanus 1/2 (2016), 79). This sentiment is expressed even stronger by Amuluche-Greg 
Nnamani, “The Flow of African Spirituality into World Christianity: A Case for Pneumatol-
ogy and Migration”, Mission Studies 32 (2015), 332. For a critical perspective, cf. Jan Platvoet, 
Henk J. van Rinsum, “Is Africa Incurably Religious? Confessing and Contesting an Invention”, 
Exchange 32/2 (2003), 123-153. More discussion in Frans Wijsen, “Are Africans Incurably Reli-
gious? Discourse Analysis of a Debate, Direction of a Discipline”, Exchange 46 (2017), 370-397.
6   Baffour K. Takyi, “Secular Government in Sub-Saharan Africa”, in The Oxford Handbook 
of Secularism, eds. Phil Zuckerman and John R. Shook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017), 210.
7   Steve Bruce, Secularisation: In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 14. On secularisation in the non-Western world, cf. ibid., chapter 9.
8   Aylward Shorter, “Secularism in Africa: Introducing the Problem”, African Christian Studies 
13/1 (1997), 1. Cf. also his Secularism in Africa — A Case Study: Nairobi City (Nairobi: Paulines 
Publications Africa, 1997).
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contexts. David Martin, for example, has defended that secularisation — 
even within Europe — follows different historical pathways. Church-state 
relationships (France, Russia), the distance between centre and periphery 
(American Mid-West, Bible-belts), and the degree to which religion became 
an expression of cultural identity (Northern Ireland, Poland) have influenced 
the nature and measure of secularisation throughout the West.9 More or 
less in line with Eisenstadt’s idea of ‘multiple modernities’,10 several authors 
reject a universalizing concept of modernity based on Western (particularly 
European) experiences. Thus, in a recent issue of the Cairo Journal of Theol-
ogy Herman Paul writes that secularisation in Africa must be liberated from 
Western connotations. Moreover, he claims that the small body of existing 
scholarship on secularisation in Africa ‘has a lot to offer to Western Christians 
pondering the pros and cons of their inherited secularisation paradigm’.11
In this article I want to explore the shape of secularisation in the Majority 
World, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. In doing so, I accept that something 
like secularisation can and does happen outside the West (contrary to the first 
view), but that it will play out differently (contrary to the second view). Regard-
less of the variety in theories of secularisation, what they have in common is 
the acceptance of societal differentiation as their theoretical core.12 Societies 
become more differentiated when ancient agricultural lifestyles based on vil-
lage life, the extended family and the cycle of seasons are increasingly replaced 
by lifestyles in which individuals respond to different institutions, each with 
their own systems and laws based on functional reason and science. There is 
no use in denying that these developments towards a new social order are hap-
pening all over the planet, that is, that the spheres of politics, economics, edu-
cation, et cetera are becoming more autonomous and rationalised — also in 
Africa. So, while it is important to employ sufficient theoretical flexibility so as 
to account for the profound differences between the West and the South, there 
is no reason why we should reject out of hand the possibility of finding similar 
9    David Martin, A General Theory of Secularization (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); Idem, 
On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).
10   Shmuel Eisenstadt (ed.), Multiple Modernities (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
2002). Cf. Benno van den Toren and Willem J. de Wit, “Secularisation and Discipleship in 
Africa: Conclusions and Recommendations”, Cairo Journal of Theology 2 (2015), 153.
11   Herman Paul, “Secularisation in Africa: A Research Desideratum”, Cairo Journal of Theol-
ogy 2 (2015), 75. The examples that he gives are mostly instances of the so-called ‘internal 
secularisation’ of religions, a phenomenon which is amply described by standard secu-
larisation theories. Unfortunately, this special issue of CJT, while dedicated to the study of 
secularisation in Africa, does not pay attention to the current state of affairs in the social 
sciences with regard to secularisation theory.
12   Paas, “Post-Christian”. Cf. Gorski, “Historicizing the Secularization Debate”, 142-143.
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correlations between industrialisation, urbanisation, and technology on the 
one hand and religious change on the other in the South — even though these 
correlations have been first observed in the West.13 After all, what cannot be 
compared cannot be understood.
In studying non-Western secularisation, I take a cue from the classic idea of 
Max Weber, recently updated by a number of scholars, that secularisation in 
many respects is a post-Christian phenomenon.14 In other words, Christianity — 
especially in its capacity to reform minds and manners — has unintendedly 
contributed to its own demise. If that is the case, the success of Christian 
evangelism all over the world is likely to have long-term consequences for the 
emergence of secularisation outside the West.15 Here I will concentrate on reli-
gious revivals, as they are well-attested in history as well as cross-culturally. My 
hypothesis is that the deeply individualistic concept of evangelism employed 
in revivals contributes to the development of what Charles Taylor has aptly 
termed ‘the buffered self ’. With this concept he points to the emergence of 
the modern individual who increasingly feels existentially secure, through dis-
enchantment on the one hand and confidence in his or her powers of moral 
ordering on the other.16 This buffered self is opposed to the ‘porous self ’, iden-
tified by the lack of a clear boundary between mind and world, thus opening 
the mind to all sorts of visible and invisible influences from the outside world.17
So, there are two elements that contribute to this impregnable or ‘buffered’ 
self, and they will be the focus of this article: (a) the development of new ways 
of thinking (reformation of mind), more or less comparable to Weber’s ideas 
of rationalisation and disenchantment, and (b) the ‘reformation of manners’ 
(self-discipline and activism) that creates a disciplined lifestyle and (often) 
wealth. Both disciplined thinking and a disciplined life lead to an increased 
sense of existential security. Recent cross-cultural research shows that the 
level of existential security predicts rather well how important religion is for 
individuals and societies (see below, section 3). This alone suggests that there 
actually is something universal in the secularisation experience. Moreover, 
13   As for Africa, cf. Paul Gifford, Christianity, Development and Modernity in Africa (London: 
Hurst & Company, 2015), esp. 157-160.
14   Cf. for example, Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap, 2007); Larry 
Siedentop, Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism (London: Penguin, 
2014).
15   Cf. already William J. Samarin, “Religion and Modernization in Africa”, Anthropological 
Quarterly 39 (1966), 288-297, esp. 295, footnote 8: ‘One should have to rank Christian mis-
sions as the greatest secularising forces in Africa’.
16   Taylor, Secular Age, 27, cf. 37-42.
17   Taylor, Secular Age, 27, 35-43.
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existential security contributes to the emergence of a post-materialist world-
view with highly subjectivist values and life-projects that do not sit well with 
traditional religion.
In what follows I will first discuss some conceptual issues regarding secu-
larisation. Then I will flesh out the revivalist experience and its attendant con-
cept of evangelism, based on the historical template of the eighteenth century 
revivals in Europe. I will focus on the modernising and secularising elements of 
these revivals, that is their disciplines of thought and conduct that contribute 
to ‘buffered’ selves or a sense of existential security. Third, I will turn to the 
Pentecostal revivals of Sub-Saharan Africa, and I will ask whether we see simi-
lar trends towards secularisation there. I will conclude this article with some 
suggestions for further research.
2 The Concept of Secularisation
The term ‘secularisation’ denotes a process by which (gradually or rapidly, un-
intendedly or intentionally) the ‘religious’ gives way to the ‘secular’. Clearly, 
the term predicates on the possibility to define both the ‘secular’ and the ‘reli-
gious’, and subsequently to distinguish them from each other. Several scholars 
have pointed out that this distinction ‘emerged as a theological category of 
Western Christendom that has no equivalent in other religious traditions or 
even in Eastern Christianity’.18 According to José Casanova the recognition of 
this historical fact means that processes of secularisation due to the ‘world-
historical process of globalization initiated by the European colonial expan-
sion’ are ‘dynamically interrelated and mutually constituted’.19 The same goes, 
by contrast, for the category (not the term as such) of the ‘religious’ that was a 
product of Western modernity. In other words, to raise the question whether 
‘secularisation’ happens in Africa, or in other parts of the Majority World, is to 
project a historically Western and Christian dichotomy between ‘religion’ and 
‘secularity’ on societies where this dichotomy may not be as relevant, or even 
understood at all. Also, by its naïve use of words like ‘civilisation’ and ‘moder-
nity’, it tends to construct a universal global-historical reality where different 
nations and people groups are classified based on the ‘level’ of civilisation they 
18   José Casanova, “The Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms”, in Rethinking Secularism. eds. 
Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, Jonathan van Antwerpen (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 56. Cf. Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, 
Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
19   Casanova, “The Secular”, 61.
Downloaded from Brill.com11/13/2020 10:27:49AM
via Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
32 Paas
Exchange 48 (2019) 26-50
have achieved, whereby European secularity is usually the tacit norm against 
which progress is measured.20 On the other hand, if Western secularity is in-
deed ‘fundamentally and inevitably post-Christian’ (Casanova) we may ask 
whether secularisation of a more Western type — societal differentiation and 
religious decline — may happen in other parts of the world as well, as a long-
term consequence of successful Christian mission. That is, at least, the ques-
tion that will be discussed below.
As for the distinction itself, attempts to define and distinguish ‘religious’ 
from ‘secular’ beliefs, routines or attitudes, are always somewhat arbitrary.21 
For example, is giving gifts to ancestors in African traditions ‘religious’? In 1936 
J.H. Driberg argued that it is ‘in fact a purely secular attitude’, as ancestors are 
not worshipped but simply recognized as somehow still one with the society 
of the living.22 Similarly, John Peel, in his fascinating study of the appropria-
tion of Christianity by the Yoruba in Nigeria, notes the reluctance of especially 
African Christians in the 19th century to designate Yoruba religion as a ‘reli-
gion’ at all. They preferred to call the daily practices of incantations, sacrifices, 
rituals, healings and so forth as ‘making country fashion’.23 To frame the prac-
tice of ancestor veneration as ‘religious’ (or ‘purely secular’, for that matter) 
may have more to do with the lenses of Western missionaries than with Afri-
can self-understanding. Similar claims are made about other aspects of African 
religion, as we shall see below. This shows how the use of terms like ‘cult’, ‘wor-
ship’ or ‘religion’ for certain features of African cultures are already burdened 
with meaning, and may hold the risk of reconstructing such features in terms 
of the classic Western dichotomy between ‘religion’ and the ‘secular’. On the 
other hand, the same problem goes with other concepts such as ‘nation’, ‘state’, 
‘politics’, ‘art’, ‘private/public’, ‘people’ or ‘economy’. If a word or a distinction 
has not been explicitly minted by a certain culture, or is not even recognized 
by it, this does not mean that it cannot be used to analyse some of its expres-
sions. Peel, for example, makes abundant and convincing use of the concept 
‘religion’ to describe 19th-century Yoruba customs.24
Another important point to make is that the ‘secular’ and the ‘religious’ are 
not mutually exclusive categories or essences. Practices and discourses can be 
20   Casanova, “The Secular”, 63.
21   Cf. Asad, Formations, 25.
22   J.H. Driberg, “The Secular Aspect of Ancestor-Worship in Africa”, Journal of the Royal 
African Society 35 (1936), 1-21. I derive this quotation from Jack David Eller, “Varieties of 
Secular Experience” in Handbook. Zuckerman, Shook, 499.
23   John D.Y. Peel, Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2000), 90.
24   Peel, Religious Encounter, 88-90.
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‘secular’ or ‘religious’ depending on who is looking or how they are explained.25 
Take, for example, a cross on a church building. Is this a ‘religious’ symbol, 
reflecting the memory of Christ’s death for our sins, or is it rather a ‘secular’ 
symbol representing the public presence of the church as a factor in society? 
When the Pope speaks, does this qualify as religious discourse or is it rather 
political speech? When a politician says that human rights are ‘sacred’, is that 
a secular or a religious claim? One could argue that, in order to have an im-
pact in this world, religions must engage with the secular and mundane in all 
sorts of ways. Or, in Jack Eller’s nice phrase: ‘[R]eligion slips into the world 
as the world slips into religion’.26 Again, this shows that it will not do to as-
sume that terms like ‘religion’ and the ‘secular’ can be universalized, or that 
they represent certain essences that can be found everywhere. Recognizing 
this may in the end mean that the whole distinction becomes obsolete, or dies 
the death of a thousand definitions. However, it may retain something of its 
meaning within delimited discourses such as secularisation as a post-Christian 
phenomenon. And this points, again, towards constructing the question about 
secularisation in Africa as a question about the consequences of some types of 
Christian evangelism in this continent.
3 An ‘Enlightenment of the Common Man’
As John and Jean Comaroff have pointed out in their study of British non-
conformist missionaries to the South-African Tswana in the early 19th century, 
their mission was to a large extent a ‘civilizing’ mission. Intellectuals, mission-
aries and politicians were in agreement about Christianity as more or less the 
soul of Western civilisation. Committed to self-improvement and always aware 
of the fragile nature of their achievements, the missionaries used their own 
(idealised) biographies as the template to lead the heathen to salvation.
And what they wished to see was a neat fusion of three idealized worlds: 
the scientific, capitalist age in its most ideologically roseate form, wherein 
individuals were free to better themselves and to aspire to every greater 
heights; an idyllic countryside in which, alongside agrarian estates, hard-
working peasants, equipped with suitable tools, might produce gainfully 
for the market; and a sovereign Empire of God, whose temporal affairs 
25   Eller, “Varieties”, 502.
26   Eller, “Varieties”, 512.
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would remain securely under the eye, if not the daily management, of 
divine authority.27
Elsewhere I have described in more detail how this enterprise implied the 
restructuring of mind and manners.28 In her Roads to Modernity, Gertrude 
Himmelfarb emphasises the extent to which Wesley’s Methodism popularised 
Enlightenment thinking among its constituency. She goes so far as to call evan-
gelicalism ‘something like an Enlightenment of the common man’.29 Similarly, 
other authors such as David Bebbington and Jeremy Gregory have emphasised 
the merger of Enlightenment rationalism and biblical piety that was charac-
teristic of the evangelical movement.30 David Bosch writes about the mission 
movement that emerged from the evangelical revivals as ‘mission in the wake 
of the Enlightenment’. He describes this mission movement as democratic, ac-
tivist, individualised, and with great confidence in human powers of reason 
and organization.31
Early evangelicalism’s emphasis on disciplined thinking and a reason-
able faith had to do with its conversionism. For sincere believers there was 
the possibility of absolute assurance of salvation. David Bebbington consid-
ers this doctrine the ‘underlying factor’ of the discontinuities between earlier 
Anglo-Saxon conservative Protestantism and evangelicalism. According to 
him, the dynamism of the evangelical movement ‘was possible only because 
its adherents were assured in their faith’.32 He traces this back to the far greater 
confidence of the evangelical preachers in the powers of human knowledge. 
Assured knowledge of God was possible, and this meant a great deal for the 
confidence individual Christians could have in seeing what was right for soci-
ety, and for fighting its evils.33
In the background of all this lie some problems emerging from the success 
of the Protestant Reformation in the 16th and 17th century. Although many 
scholars have emphasised the Reformation’s rationalising character, taking its 
27   Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution, 59.
28   Stefan Paas, “Revival, Reason and Riches: Evangelism and Secularization”. Some para-
graphs in this section have been derived from this article.
29   Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Roads to Modernity: The British, French, and American Enlight-
enments (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), 126.
30   Bebbington, Evangelicalism, 50-55; Jeremy Gregory, “Introduction: Transforming the 
‘Age of Reason’ into ‘an Age of Faiths’: or, Putting Religions and Beliefs (Back) into 
the Eighteenth Century”, Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 32/3 (2009), 287-305.
31   David Bosch, Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission (Maryknoll: 
Orbis Books, 2008 (24th ed.)), 262-345.
32   Bebbington, Evangelicalism, 42.
33   Bebbington, Evangelicalism, 47-48.
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anti-sacramental and individualistic tendency as examples,34 one could also 
defend the claim that exactly these features increased anxiety among those 
it affected. While it could not and would not abolish the idea of a cosmos in 
which supernatural forces were active, Protestantism was deprived of the 
protective means provided by the Catholic sacramental system. To depict the 
Protestant tradition as a straightforward process of ‘disenchantment’ would, 
therefore, be a mistake. On the contrary, Robert Scribner mentions a host of 
examples from 16th and 17th century Protestant Europe which demonstrate 
how these early Protestants lived in a porous universe, taking their recourse 
to all sorts of (word) magic in order to still their fears.35 For a long time, and 
in some respects more than ever before, demons, devils, witches and curses 
were an ingredient of serious theological and philosophical discourse.36 In 
this sense there are interesting parallels with today’s Pentecostalism in large 
parts of the world.37 It may be the case that a transition from traditional, col-
lective forms of folk religion towards individualised, modern religious beliefs 
often goes through an intermediate stage of existential angst in which all sorts 
of previously ‘domesticated’ spiritual forces break loose and must be ‘tamed’ 
again. Meanwhile, the emergence of new individualised religious practices 
finds much of its motivation in the urge to control this unruly spiritual realm 
by reinforcing the individual’s defences up to the point where the existence of 
the supernatural becomes implausible.
Evangelicalism, then, brought assuredness, both on the spiritual and the so-
cietal level. As a disciplining force, it was ‘an avenue of upward social mobility’, 
and thus there was ‘a natural tendency for converted characters to gain skills, 
find regular employment and so rise out of the lowest ranks of society’.38 In the 
modern missionary movement that arose from these experiences the evangeli-
cal ethos was considered as the soul of a transformed society, which resulted in 
promoting the revivalist experience as a key to changing societies haunted by 
34   Cf. Gorski, “Historicizing the Secularisation Debate”, 148-150. For an example, cf. Brad 
Gregory, The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).
35   Cf. Robert W. Scribner, “The Reformation, Popular Magic, and the ‘Disenchantment of the 
World”‘, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 23/3 (1992), 475-494.
36   Euan Cameron, Enchanted Europe: Superstition, Reason, and Religion, 1250-1750 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 2-3.
37   See, for example, a similar explanation for the success of Pentecostal/charismatic 
churches in Ghana, by Birgit Meyer, Translating the Devil: Religion and Modernity among 
the Ewe in Ghana (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), xviii. On ‘word magic’ in 
neo-Pentecostalism, cf. my “Mission from Anywhere to Europe: Americans, Africans, and 
Australians Coming to Amsterdam”, Mission Studies, 32/1 (2015), 4-31.
38   Bebbington, Evangelicalism, 25-27, 111, 126-127.
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paganism and superstition for the good.39 Already in 1811 the American Board 
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions declared: ‘Now is the time for the fol-
lowers of Christ to come forward boldly and engage earnestly in the great work 
of enlightening and reforming mankind’.40 In her analysis of American Protes-
tant mission activity in 19th century Syria and Lebanon Marwa Elshakry shows 
how ‘enlightenment’ was seen as a precondition for ‘reformation’. Thus, a ‘con-
version to modernities’ (Peter van der Veer) was a crucial step in the process 
of preparing ‘backward’ societies for Christianity. Evangelistic mission usually 
went together with the promotion of Western medicine and science educa-
tion, with the explicit purpose of demonstrating the futility of traditional ways 
of thinking and to replace them by a Christian mind-set. In the end, this could 
mean that ‘an exclusively religious concern with conversion was complicated 
by a growing commitment to secular and civilizing ventures’.41
Assuredness also expressed itself in the material realm. A ‘reformation of 
manners’ (William Wilberforce) would usually lead to an improvement in terms 
of education, employment and income. And as increasing wealth often tem-
pers religious zeal, this could easily become another driver of secularisation. 
John Wesley himself already noticed how conversion could lead to religious 
indifference. In 1786, at the age of 83, Wesley wrote a letter, titled ‘Thoughts 
on Methodism’, in which he postulated a causal relationship between the per-
sonal discipline gained by conversion to Christianity and the erosion of faith.42 
Wesley’s observations are in line with the virtually universal claim by religious 
leaders throughout history that wealth is an enemy of a serious faith and re-
ligious practice. Their more or less intuitive belief that it is more difficult for 
the rich to enter the kingdom of heaven, has been confirmed by modern social 
scientists. There is a strong inverse correlation between wealth and religiosity, 
both on the individual level and on the level of nations.43 With regard to the 
39   Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, 
and Consciousness in South Africa (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 46-84.
40   Quoted in Marwa Elshakry, “The Gospel of Science and American Evangelism in Late 
Ottoman Beirut”, Past and Present 196 (2007), 173-214, 174.
41   Elshakry, “Gospel”, 174.
42   Thomas Jackson, The Works of John Wesley (The University of California: Zondervan Pub-
lishers, 1872), Vol. 13, 258, 260-261, sections 1, 10-12, ‘Thoughts upon Methodism’ (supple-
mentary letters, 4 August 1786).
43   Gregory Paul, “The Chronic Dependence of Popular Religiosity upon Dysfunctional 
Psychosociological Conditions”, Evolutionary Psychology 7/3 (2009). Cf. Katie Simmons 
et al., “Worldwide, Many See Belief in God as Essential to Morality: Richer Nations Are 
Exception”, Pew Research Center (updated May 27, 2014; available online). For an elabo-
rate discussion, cf. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and 
Politics Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Cf. further Tom Rees, 
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latter, it must be added that this correlation can be observed predominantly 
in nations where wealth is spread relatively equally among the population. 
In countries where there are huge differences between the rich and the poor 
(such as the United States), religiosity seems less affected by an increase of 
the total national wealth. Probably the personal insecurity that is the result 
of a very unequal distribution of wealth, stimulates people to take refuge in 
religion, whereas in countries with a good social security system the need for 
religion diminishes.
Of course, evangelical missions were not out to secularise the Majority 
World.44 But there is reason to assume that they contributed, both within and 
outside the West, to the emergence of a ‘buffered self ’. By its promotion of 
rational thinking in religion and its emphasis on disciplined bodies, it had the 
potential to secularise those among whom it had success. While there is no 
necessary connection between assured selves and secularisation (as evangeli-
calism amply testifies), one can lead to another. This may especially be the case 
where revivals are part of wider changes in lifestyles and socio-economic con-
ditions in societies — such as the shift from a traditional agricultural society to 
a more urban and individualised society. The Anglo-Saxon revivals of the 18th 
and 19th centuries belonged to such a context. The same phenomenon may be 
observed today in countries where similar conditions of industrialisation and 
urbanisation play out against a background of traditional religiosity. The next 
section explores several possible examples.
4 Secularisation in Africa
According to Jonathan R. Beloff ‘[a]gnosticism and atheism have (…) increased 
sharply’ in Rwanda among the community of those who survived the geno-
cide of 1994. The killings have also triggered a response on the part of govern-
ment parties to work towards a separation of church and state, thus initiating a 
differentiation of religion and politics in a very religious country.45 In a 
“Is Personal Insecurity a Cause of Cross-National Differences in the Intensity of Religious 
Belief?”, Journal of Religion and Society 11 (2009), 1-24; Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, 
“Are High Levels of Existential Security Conducive to Secularisation? A Response to Our 
Critics”, in The Changing World Religion Map: Sacred Places, Identities, Practices and Poli-
tics, ed Stanley D. Brunn (Dordrecht: Springer Science, 2015), 3389-3408.
44   For a useful critique, cf. Peel, Religious Encounter, 5.
45   Jonathan R. Beloff, “The Historical Relationship between Religion and Government in 
Rwanda”, in Global Secularisms in a Post-Secular Age. eds. Michael Rectenwald, Rochelle 
Almeida, George Levine (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 205-221.
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different way, but based on a similar critique of the problematic relationship 
of a dominant Christianity with the ruling powers, South-Africa’s 1996 Con-
stitution ‘requires the state to be neutral in religious matters and to follow 
non-discriminatory policies towards the followers of all religions’.46 Moreover, 
Nico Vorster presents some census data indicating that between 1996 and 2001 
the percentage of those who claimed to have no religion grew from 11.7 to 15.1 
percent. He also notes a ‘rapid de-churchification’ within the white Afrikaner 
community and traditional English-speaking churches, but nothing similar 
within black communities.47 This difference is explained partly by the high 
levels of ‘education, material welfare and connectedness’ to the global world of 
the white community, and partly by the different roles Christianity has played 
for blacks and whites in the struggle around apartheid.48 And to add yet an-
other structural feature of possible secularisation: several authors mention 
the changing patterns of family life in Africa, due to urbanisation and edu-
cation, which may affect religious socialisation as well.49 Studies in the West 
have shown how even overwhelmingly religious societies can secularise in the 
course of a few generations when religious socialisation begins to falter.
This mixed picture shows that the link between modernisation (in itself a 
very heterogeneous concept) and secularisation should not be essentialised. 
We may very well see different and opposing trends at the same time in mod-
ernising countries. On the other hand, these examples suggest that some forms 
of secularisation may and do happen in Sub-Saharan Africa. This invites us 
to take a closer look at the supposed link between Protestant revivalism and 
(long-term) secularisation. Does this pattern repeat itself in Africa?
4.1 Christianity and Secularisation in Africa
As Africa has experienced an explosion of revivalist Christianity,50 it should 
be a fertile ground to investigate correlations between the development of a 
46   Nico Vorster, “Christianity and Secularisation in South Africa: Probing the Possible Link 
between Modernisation and Secularisation”, Studies in World Christianity 19/2 (2013), 147.
47   Vorster, “Christianity and Secularisation”, 150.
48   Vorster, “Christianity and Secularisation”, 155-156.
49   On changes in African family life in general, cf. Gerald K. Tanye, The Church-As-Family 
and Ethnocentrism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Berlin: LIT-Verlag, 2010). On changing family 
patterns and secularisation, cf. Kang’entu Geoffrey Kimathi, “The Rise of Secularisation 
in Kenya and Its Impact to the Church”, (MA Thesis Norwegian School of Theology , 2017), 
97-99.
50   Examples in J. Kwabena Asamoah-Gyadu, “Pulling down Strongholds: Evangelism, Prin-
cipalities and Powers and the African Pentecostal Imagination”, International Review of 
Mission 382/383 (2007), 306-317.
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‘buffered self ’ as a consequence of conversion on the one hand and deteriora-
tion of religious enthusiasm on the other. However, there is very little research 
into secularisation in Africa.51 This may partly be due to the aforementioned 
ethnicist view that Africans are ‘notoriously religious’ (John Mbiti). As such, 
secularisation may be seen as a purely Western import product, imposed on 
Africans by development agencies52 or Western academic education. As for 
the latter influence, this was already noticed by the Vatican Secretariat for 
Non-Believers in its 1972 colloquium on secularism in Kampala, Uganda. The 
report that was issued defined secularisation as an increase of indifferentism 
and unbelief among the educated minorities as a result of Western-style high-
er education.53 Benno van den Toren suggests that in French-speaking Africa 
the influence of the Western idea that to be ‘educated’ means to be ‘secular’ 
may be stronger than in other parts of Africa.54 He also notes that in Bangui, 
the capital of the Central African Republic, especially the rich ‘tend to push 
their faith to the margins of their lives’. He writes: ‘[I]t seems that many go to 
church when they are in need, but when they enter into the more affluent con-
stituencies of society they no longer feel the need for church attendance’.55 It is 
unclear to what extent this relates to a revivalist prehistory, but is an indication 
that the same inverse correlation between wealth and religious fervour that 
has been noticed elsewhere is also a feature in African milieus.
Interestingly, Van den Toren suggests that there is a form of secularisation 
that is ‘more specific for Africa: the secularisation of religion by making reli-
gious practices (…) serve secular goals’.56 He quotes John V. Taylor, who said 
that Africa’s ‘this-worldliness’ might easily turn to ‘materialism’. Van den Toren 
51   Cf. Paul, “Secularisation in Africa”.
52   Cf. Mustapha Hashim Kurfi, “Secularisation and Development in Africa: A Terrific 
Façade”, Global Journal of Human Social Science 13/6 (2013), 15-19.
53   Sécularisation en Afrique? Secularisation in Africa?, Rome: Secretariat for non-believers 
1973. For discussion, cf. Shorter, ‘Secularism in Africa’; Paul, “Secularisation in Africa”, 
69-70.
54   Benno van den Toren, “Secularisation in Africa: A Challenge for the Churches”, Africa Jour-
nal of Evangelical Theology 22/1 (2003), 8.
55   Ibid., 4, 7-8. For a similar perspective, cf. Elio Messi Metogo, Dieu peut-il mourir en Afrique? 
Essai sur l’indifférence religieuse et l’incroyance en Afrique noire (Paris: Presses de l’UCAC, 
1997), 79.
56   Ibid., 11-12; Van den Toren and De Wit, “Secularisation and Discipleship”, 156-157. Cf. also 
Metogo, Dieu peut-il mourir en Afrique? Peel, Religious Encounter, 215-247, shows how for 
the nineteenth-century Yoruba Christianity was interesting to the extent that it was as-
sociated with ‘power’. Such power was needed to achieve children, money and a long 
life — the main preoccupations of Yoruba religion. His chapter on conversion contains 
fascinating parallels to Van den Toren’s argument.
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adds his concern about the ‘charismatic movement’ in Africa, which combines 
‘a health and wealth Gospel with a theology that sees financial and physical 
prosperity as a direct consequence of a life according to God’s will’.57 He adds 
that from a Christian perspective ‘the God-directed focus should be a central 
element of true religion in distinction from all sorts of semi- or even pseudo-
religious practices’.58 This ‘remarkably qualitative’59 approach of secularisa-
tion might open new perspectives towards research of secularisation in Africa, 
but I would like to emphasise that a pragmatic use of religion in itself is not 
what most scholars would see as secularisation. People have always and every-
where prayed to the gods for healing, success, children, or security. ‘Secularisa-
tion’ denotes a process in which religion becomes less important for societies 
and individuals. In other words, if Africans would stop praying for health or 
money, and turn to other means to achieve these goals, this would be a sure 
sign of secularisation. In short, it would amount to a category mistake to con-
fuse the ‘secular’ dimension that every religion inevitably has (and which, in 
fact, points to the importance of religion in daily life rather than its opposite) 
with the process of secularisation by which religion loses its importance and is 
relegated to abstract, non-consequential spheres.
Nevertheless, this instrumental view of religion, while in itself not seculari-
sation, may lead to secularisation when people feel that religion has served 
its purpose or fails to deliver. This may well happen through an initial stage 
of revival. Van den Toren asserts that the rapid urbanisation of Africa offers 
‘great opportunities for Christian witness’, thus referring to the revivalist pat-
tern of early modern Europe and modern Latin America. However, he also 
notes that his move to the cities ‘is a cause for backsliding and secularisation’.60 
Here he seems to think mainly of well-described secularising features like the 
differentiation and rationalisation of modern city life. Earlier this was noted 
by Aylward Shorter, and recently this has been reiterated by Kang’entu Geof-
frey Kimathi based on his fieldwork in Nairobi. Kimathi finds that decreas-
ing church attendance, the erosion of Christian morality and the increase of 
‘nominal’ religion in Kenya applies more to the young than to the old, more 
to the educated than to the illiterate and more to the affluent than to the 
poor.61 In the same vein Dick Seed mentions ‘Africa’s rapid transition in the use 
of technology’ as a secularising factor (rationalisation), as well as ‘new levels of 
57   Van den Toren, “Secularisation in Africa”, 26.
58   Benno van den Toren, “African Neo-Pentecostalism in the Face of Secularisation: Prob-
lems and Possibilities”, Cairo Theological Journal 2 (2015), 109.
59   Thus, Paul, “Secularisation in Africa”, 74.
60   Ibid., 18. Cf. Van den Toren and De Wit, “Secularisation and Discipleship”, 160.
61   Shorter, Secularism in Africa; Kimathi, “The Rise of Secularisation”.
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material prosperity’ which ‘feeds into the sense of well-being and disassocia-
tion with spiritual issues that dominated the past’.62 According to Seed, the 
church has contributed to this emerging secular outlook through its mission, 
by its attempt to break the power of the spiritual world with Western medicine, 
by introducing an education system founded on secularised principles and the 
adoption of science in agriculture. Thus, it has ‘responded to spiritual ques-
tions with secular answers and so advanced secularisation’.63 That Christianity 
is ‘among the ancient causes of secularisation in Africa’ is emphasised by a 
number of African scholars, thus reinforcing the idea that there is a correlation 
between Christian evangelism and secularisation.64
4.2 Pentecostalism as a Secularising Force in Africa?
All this raises the question to what extent Pentecostalism, the most popular 
and fastest growing variety of Christianity in modern Africa,65 may be a sign of 
or even a driver towards (more) secularisation in this continent. Pentecostal-
ism is not only the historical successor of 18th and 19th century evangelicalism 
(Methodism), but it also contains many structural parallels with this older 
revival-movement, both in terms of its internal dynamics and in terms of the 
societal conditions in which it thrives.66 Throughout the world, Pentecostalism 
appears particularly attractive to the upwardly mobile and it often promotes 
an entrepreneurial spirit. Moreover, recent versions of Pentecostalism almost 
universally preach a version of the so-called ‘prosperity gospel’, encouraging 
believers to pursue material wealth as a clear sign of God’s blessing. Finally, 
Pentecostalism seems to thrive especially in societies where a transition has 
started from older, Durkheimian forms of religion (or Christianity) to more 
modern, individualised patterns. As such, it may also become a driver of (more) 
secularisation when its reformation of minds and manners is successful.
62   Dick Seed, “Western Secularism, African Worldviews, and the Church”, Cairo Journal of 
Theology 2 (2015), 78.
63   Seed, “Western Secularism”, 83. For a somewhat different perspective, cf. Retief Müller, 
“Afrikaner Missionaries and the Slippery Slope of Praying for Rain”, Exchange 46 (2017), 
29-45.
64   E.g., Abiola T. Dopanu, “Secularisation, Christianity and the African Religion in Yorubal-
and”, AFER 48/3 (2006), 146-147; Abel Ngarsouledé, “Sociological and Theological Perspec-
tives on Secularisation in Africa”, Cairo Journal of Theology 2 (2015), 94.
65   Asamoah-Gyadu, “Evangelism”, 310, calls this the ‘Pentecostalisation’ of African Christian-
ity. Cf. also Damaris Seleina Parsitau, “From the Periphery to the Centre: The Pentecostali-
sation of Mainline Christianity in Kenya”, Missionalia 35/3 (2007), 83-111.
66   Cf. David Martin, Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1990), esp. chapter 2 (“The Methodist Model: Anglo-American Cultural 
Production Reproduced in Latin America”).
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All the same, Pentecostalism with its deeply enchanted worldview seems a 
very unfit candidate for being associated with secularisation. In fact, some au-
thors have explained the emergence of Pentecostalism in Africa as a reaction 
against the presumed rationalising approach of Western mission.67 Thus, in 
his study of influential Pentecostal preachers from Nigeria, Paul Gifford argues 
that ‘the enchanted imagination is pervasive in African Pentecostalism’.68 He 
rejects the view that Africa is just another variety of modernity, given its strong 
belief in magic, and the thoroughly anti-scientific philosophy of African neo-
Pentecostal leaders. Moreover, the deep-rooted fears and suspicions generated 
by belief in witchcraft are generally a counterforce to the formation of wealth, 
as economic progress depends on a society where people feel that they can 
trust each other.69 As such, secularisation theories based on the decrease of 
religion in industrialising countries of the West miss the point with regard to 
Africa: they underestimate that African religion is totally different from reli-
gion in other parts of the world.70
Somewhat similarly, Linda van de Kamp shows how Brazilian Pentecostal 
churches in Mozambique make their attendants lose considerable amounts 
of money through tithing and sacrificing, while making especially urban 
women more suspicious of their spouses, relatives and friends through their 
constant hammering on the theme of witchcraft.71 Surely, she points out how 
Pentecostal churches help women to ‘arm’ themselves against the evil influ-
ence of the so-called ‘spirit spouse’, a presumed invisible ‘husband’ who pen-
etrates the female body and obstructs sexuality, marriage and procreation. 
However, this ‘buffering of the self ’ is not done through a reformation of the 
mind, for example by denying that the spirit spouse exists, but through ‘magi-
cal’ means. Women are taught to mistrust their own relatives, as they can very 
67   E.g., Asamoah-Gyadu, “Evangelism”, 309; Rijk van Dijk, “After Pentecostalism? Exploring 
Intellectualism, Secularisation and Guiding Sentiments in Africa”, in Multiple Secularities 
Beyond the West: Religion and Modernity in the Global Age, ed. Marian Burchardt et al. 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), 217-218.
68   Gifford, Christianity, Development and Modernity, 147.
69   This may not be the case in other African nations. See, e.g., Harri Englund, “Pentecostal-
ism beyond Belief: Trust and Democracy in a Malawian Township”, Africa 77/4 (2007), 
477-499, who claims that Pentecostalism in Malawi furthers civility and mutual trust, 
and Naomi Haynes, “Pentecostalism and the Morality of Money: Prosperity, Inequality, 
and Religious Sociality on the Zambian Copperbelt”, Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Society 18 (2012), 134-135, who claims that the material wealth gained by individuals can 
reinforce a society where social relationships are structured around economic inequality.
70   Gifford, Christianity, Development and Modernity, 163-164.
71   Linda van de Kamp, Violent Conversion: Brazilian Pentecostalism and the urban pioneering 
of women in Mozambique (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 2011), 47-51, 133-160, 197-219.
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well be channels for evil spirits and they are encouraged to ask the Holy Spirit 
for guidance to expose the spirit spouse. They participate in exorcist rituals 
offered by the church and they assume techniques of ‘spiritual warfare’. Van 
de Kamp admits that these practices address ‘the challenges of contemporary 
urban life in Maputo and offer women techniques to regain or establish con-
trol’ in rapidly changing social conditions. But the techniques that are offered 
are more focused on the body than on the mind, and to some extent they in-
crease the sense of disconnection and vulnerability that is the consequence 
of individualisation and the loosening of family ties.72 So, while contributing 
somehow to the development of a ‘buffered self ’, the ‘buffering’ is a reforma-
tion of ‘manners’ rather than ‘mind’. The enchanted world is left intact, and is 
even affirmed to the point where it becomes a constant threat for individuals 
who do no longer have the protection of relatives or traditional magic.
This seems to support the thesis that African Pentecostalism is a ‘revenge 
of the sacred’, a typical religious response of the notoriously religious African 
mind to secularising pressures from the West. However, this is only one part 
of the story. Many students of Pentecostalism underline its thoroughly this-
worldly character. Regardless of how enchanted African Pentecostalism is, 
eventually God and all spiritual matters are employed in the interest of im-
manent goals.73 Pentecostal preachers stimulate people to seize opportunities 
to overcome poverty, by taking initiative and starting businesses.74 They offer 
business courses to converts, thus fostering an entrepreneurial attitude to life. 
As such, in its emphasis on personal discipline and honesty, Pentecostalism is 
often considered to be a religion that furthers upward social mobility.75 Van 
de Kamp argues that Pentecostalism’s criticism of the traditional social order 
72   Van de Kamp, Violent Conversion, 149-160.
73   Much literature in Paas, “Mission from Anywhere to Europe”. Cf. further Van den Toren, 
“African Neo-Pentecostalism”, 103-120.
74   Cf. Joseph Bosco Bangura, The Charismatic Movement in Sierra Leone (1980-2010): A Missio-
Historical Analysis in View of African Culture, Prosperity Gospel and Power Theology (Am-
sterdam: VU University Press, 2013), 237-238; André P. Czeglédy, “A New Christianity for a 
New South Africa: Charismatic Christians and the Post-Apartheid Order”, Journal of Reli-
gion in Africa 38 (2008), 287-288; Lovemore Togarasei, “Modern/Charismatic Pentecostal-
ism as a Form of ‘Religious’ Secularisation in Africa”, Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae 41/1 
(2015), 61.
75   Donald E. Miller, Tetsuano Yamamori, Global Pentecostalism: The New Face of Christian 
Social Engagement (Oakland: University of California Press, 2007). Cf. Peter Berger, “Faith 
and Development”, Society 46/1 (2009), 69-75, esp. 71. Sedefka V. Beck and Sara J. Gunders-
en have found that Pentecostal affiliation correlates with higher earned income in Ghana 
(“A Gospel of Prosperity? An Analysis of the Relationship between Religion and Earned 
Income in Ghana, the Most Religious Country in the World”, Journal for the Scientific Study 
of Religion 55/1 [2016], 105-129).
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in Africa introduces a new dynamic of individualism which is actually repre-
sentative of neo-liberal globalisation itself rather than an attempt to accom-
modate socio-economic change by drawing from religious sources.76 So, while 
her assessment of Pentecostalism’s influence on economic development in 
Mozambique is rather negative, she asserts that Pentecostalism is a ‘practice of 
pioneering’, connecting well with the pioneer society and mentality that can 
be found in urban settings in Africa.77 As such it may not contribute to a more 
prosperous society throughout, but to a society where there are a few ‘winners’ 
and many ‘losers’. And these ‘winners’ might very well become the secularis-
ing core of a future (urban) Africa, especially when they join forces with more 
rationalising approaches within Pentecostalism to reduce its ‘devil mania’ and 
‘exaggerated demonology’.78
Also, Van de Kamp observes that many members eventually become fed 
up with the constant pressures by Pentecostal preachers and leave the church 
or attend another church that is less demanding.79 In the same vein, Rijk van 
Dijk describes how ‘the emerging middle classes’ in Ghana and Botswana are 
attracted by Pentecostalism’s emphasis on ‘intellectualism’ and a ‘critical 
mentality’ against traditional social structures and traditional Christianity. 
However, this particular pattern of ‘religious modernity’ eventually creates 
resistance against the ‘noise, shouting and screaming of the Pentecostal lead-
ers, the “too-muchness” of their demands in terms of time, attention, energy 
and money, and about what was perceived as the uncritical acceptance of the 
elevated status of Pentecostal leaders, which allowed too little room for dis-
cussion or reflection of what they said and did’. Thus, ‘the educated classes 
are turning away from this involvement in Pentecostal faith’.80 However, these 
people, while not returning to the traditional churches, ‘are not abandoning 
the notions of the dark forces that may present themselves in life’. Therefore, 
assuming a (public) position as a non-believer is not a viable option, as this 
would leave the individual extremely vulnerable to the forces of darkness and 
render him or her a constant threat to others.81 So, while Pentecostalism’s 
76   According to Togarasei, “Modern/Charismatic Pentecostalism”, 60, this undermining of 
‘traditional values in favour of modern, secular values’ (consumerism, individualism) is 
in itself a form of secularisation. Likewise in Effiong Joseph Udo, “Secularism and Pente-
costalism”, Missionalia 40/1 (2012), 132-153.
77   Van de Kamp, Violent Conversion, 50-51.
78   Cf. Nnamani, “The Flow of African Spirituality”, 343.
79   Cf. Van de Kamp, Violent Conversion, 218. Cf. Linda van de Kamp, “South-South Transna-
tional Spaces of Conquest: Afro-Brazilian Pentecostalism, Feitiçaria and the Reproductive 
Domain in Urban Mozambique”, Exchange 42 (2013), 360.
80   Van Dijk, “After Pentecostalism”, 215, 218, 228-229.
81   Van Dijk, “After Pentecostalism”, 218.
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capacity to liberate traditional people from unchallenged religious author-
ity and collective patterns may eventually lead people to leave the church 
altogether, there is as yet no indication that this also leads to a disenchanted 
worldview. The most we can say is that with regard to Africa’s secularisation 
late modern Pentecostalism is an ambiguous force.82
4.3 Comparisons
At this point we may recall that Taylor’s ‘buffered self ’ consists of two elements: 
(1) a ‘reformation of mind’, usually taken as the emergence of a disenchanted 
worldview, and (2) a ‘reformation of manners’, producing a disciplined lifestyle 
with wealth-inducing values. As for the first element, there are some indica-
tions that this has happened among a small minority of educated and prosper-
ous elites in at least some African countries. However, it is unclear whether 
this is related in any way to religious revival. As far as we can see, this type of 
‘buffering’ is connected with Western-style education that was established in 
Africa through the efforts of older missions from Europe and the United States. 
Pentecostals, on the other hand, seem to have focused on the second element, 
while leaving an enchanted worldview intact (or even reinforcing it). Thus, it 
exemplifies what some scholars consider as a very African type of secularisa-
tion: instrumentalising religion in order to achieve material success. Above I 
have explained why I do not find this a very convincing approach of seculari-
sation. Pentecostalism may be an example of the way in which Africans have 
always connected the religious with the secular, but that is not what secularisa-
tion (as a social process) is about.
So, what does this mean for the possible secularising potential of Pentecos-
talism in Africa? Let me first say that the enchanted nature of African Pente-
costalism does not necessarily suggest that Africa is taking an entirely different 
route towards modernity.83 After all, as I have pointed out above, Europe has 
more or less experienced the same pattern: in a context of beginning mod-
ernisation the spiritual powers that used to be domesticated to some extent 
in traditional religion, broke loose and had to be tamed again by all sorts of 
exorcism. Far from becoming more rationalistic, post-Reformation Europe ex-
perienced a revival of the enchanted universe. It may be the case that a similar 
pattern occurs in Africa today, where traditional societies are rapidly disap-
pearing without adequate resources to handle the spiritual chaos that follows 
from this. This is not to deny the particularity of Africa, but it suggests that a 
temporary upsurge of the supernatural can very well be part of a process of 
82   Van den Toren, “African Neo-Pentecostalism”, 119.
83   As suggested by Asamoah-Gyadu, “Evangelism”, 310, following Kwame Bediako.
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modernisation and secularisation. If this is the case, African Pentecostalism 
will eventually develop forms of internal theological critique, pushing towards 
a more rationalised take of reality, more or less in the same way as in 18th cen-
tury European evangelicalism. In terms of research, this would mean that glob-
al Pentecostalism as a social movement should not merely be compared with 
18th century Methodism, but also with those preceding forms of popular Prot-
estantism in Europe which predicated on a much more profoundly enchanted 
worldview with all its attendant insecurity and existential angst.
A second consideration is that within the post-colonial consciousness of 
African nations, Christianity, or rather religiosity in general,84 can easily be-
come an expression of ‘Africanness’, especially with reference to the West. 
‘Notoriously religious’ Africans are thus distinguished from their former colo-
nizers. Here I point to David Martin’s theory of different historical pathways of 
secularisation, mentioned in section 1. High levels of religious belief and com-
mitment can be maintained, even within a secularising continent, if religion 
has become a badge of cultural identity, something that makes ‘us’ distinct 
from ‘them’. Catholic Poland and Protestant Northern Ireland are good exam-
ples from Europe, as well as the Dutch (Protestant) Bible Belt, that more or less 
marks the boundary between the Protestant North and the Catholic South. At 
the same time, such constructions are extremely vulnerable to power abuse 
and unholy alliances between politics and religion. In the long run such alli-
ances may very well breed (sometimes quite aggressive) secularisation, espe-
cially when old conflicts lose their mobilising force. Given the current appeals 
to African governments to tone down their religious rhetoric, and thus become 
more ‘secular’,85 some signs of such a process may already be observable here 
and there.
Third, it is important to remember that most Christianity in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is still very young. The great revivals in 18th-century Western Europe 
happened when Christianity had been present in those regions for more 
than a millennium. So, the possible secularising potential of Pentecostalism 
might be more clearly visible in societies where there is a longer history of 
Christianity, more social differentiation and more influence from intentional 
secularist politics (laïcité). A comparison with Latin America may therefore 
84   Cf. Danoye Oguntola Laguda, “Religious Pluralism and Secularisation in the Nigerian 
Religious Sphere”, in African Traditions in the Study of Religion, Diaspora and Gendered 
Societies: Essays in Honour of Jacob Kehinde Olupona, eds. Afe Adogame et al. (London: 
Routledge, 2013), 25-34.
85   Cf. the (generally religion-friendly) pleas in “What Secularism Means to Africa: What it 
has been, what it hasn’t been and what it could mean for human rights”, Global Interfaith 
& Secular Alliance (2017).
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be helpful. David Martin characterizes the late modern Pentecostal revivals in 
Latin America as follows:86
The context is that of religious entrepreneurship in a competitive reli-
gious economy and of enthusiastic participation on the part of all the 
believers; the inner transformation is that of honest dealing, trustworthi-
ness, peaceableness, hard work, independence, self help, mutual assis-
tance, and the ability to be articulate and fluent in the presence of others. 
Clearly all this has implications for the world of work as well as for the 
kind of work preferred. (…) Within a generation they may have put a foot 
on the ladder of small business or of educational advance.87
As Martin concentrates on the cultural conditions that make Pentecostalism 
successful, he does not analyse its potential for secularising its constituency 
in the long run. In passing, however, he notes ‘the obvious difficulty of hold-
ing young people, especially males, when confronted by the seductions of 
the adolescent and young adult life-style’. Also he mentions the ‘bureaucra-
tization of churches’ and ‘the relativization of perspective which arrives as 
the next generation acquires education’.88 He observes the ‘serious tension’ 
between ‘satisfied bodies and full pockets’ on the one hand, and the ‘central 
thrust of consumer capitalism’ on the other. Yet, he emphasises Pentecostal-
ism’s ascetic attitude with regard to money, sexual promiscuity and the use of 
mass media — and he seems to trust that this will remain a characteristic of 
the movement in the future.89
However, it is well known that turnover rates among Latin American Pen-
tecostals are very high and that many dropouts stay out of church altogether.90 
For example, a Brazilian study reports that 59% of all Pentecostals who change 
86   According to a recent Pew survey, 7% (Paraguay) to 41% (Guatemala and Honduras) of 
the populations across Latin America identify as Protestants. The average percentage 
of Protestants in the continent is 19%. Most Protestants (ca. 65%) are Pentecostals. Only 
9% of Latin Americans were raised in Protestant churches, however, showing the attrac-
tiveness of these churches to Catholics. The most frequently cited reason for Catholics to 
become Protestants was that they were ‘seeking a more personal connection with God’ 
(“Religion in Latin America”, Pew Research Center, 13 November 2014).
87   David Martin, Pentecostalism: The World Their Parish (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 72-73.
88   Ibid., 73-74. He adds: ‘These processes have tamed the organizational thrust of earlier 
movements like Methodism and dampened the ardor of believers’.
89   Ibid., 76-77.
90   The Pew report ‘Religion in Latin America’ (2014) mentions that in 1910, an estimated 
94% of the Latin Americans were Catholics, and ca. 1% Protestants. Catholics began to 
decline as a share of the region’s population in the 1970s. In 2014, 69% of Latin Americans 
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their religion in Brazil end up in the ‘no religion’ category. A survey among 
2,400 Christians in Nicaragua (2000) showed that Protestant church disaffilia-
tion was as high as 27% (19% as ‘no religion’). And three consecutive surveys 
in Costa Rica (1989-1994) showed that the Protestant apostasy rate was around 
50%.91 David Martin quotes from Kurt Bowen’s Evangelism and Apostasy 
(1996), based on research in Mexico.92 This study shows that 43% of Pentecos-
tal converts ceased to be evangelicals in the second generation, of whom the 
great majority described themselves as ‘nothing’. Also, it appears that ‘nearly 
two in three of evangelical women stay committed in the second generation, 
compared with only one in three of men’. This is interesting, given the fact 
that these Pentecostal converts were mainly from the poorer classes, and that 
especially the men reported an improvement of their living standards. This 
suggests that there is a correlation between upward mobility and the erosion 
of religious fervour.
Finally, yet another way of ‘testing’ the secularising potential of African 
Pentecostalism is to observe it under the very different circumstances of the 
African diaspora in the West. After all, secularisation is more likely to happen 
if people actually get wealthy rather than merely desiring to be rich. A nagging 
problem with Pentecostalism’s emphasis on prosperity is that wealth-inducing 
values alone are usually not sufficient to achieve riches. The prosperity preach-
ing of Pentecostalism in many African nations is greatly hindered by societal 
conditions that are harmful for economic development, such as instable gov-
ernments and widespread corruption. In most Western nations, however, con-
ditions for economic improvement are more favourable and this might liberate 
the Pentecostal potential for prosperity. In his study of the (originally Nigerian) 
Redeemed Christian Church of God in Finland, Mika Vähäkangas, for example, 
argues that it makes sense for the upwardly mobile poor to join such a prosper-
ity-preaching church, as these churches advocate pro-economic values such 
as ‘temperance, honesty and diligence, not committing adultery (…), as well 
identified as Catholics, while 19% belonged to the Protestant churches and 8% are reli-
giously unaffiliated.
91   Henri Gooren, “Conversion Careers in Latin America”, in Conversion of a Continent: Con-
temporary Religious Change in Latin America, eds. Timothy J. Steigenga, Edward L. Cleary 
(Piscataway: Rutgers Press, 2007), 63-64.
92   Ibid., 113-115. Cf. Kurt Bowen, Evangelism and Apostasy (London and Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1996). Martin affirms that Bowen’s study presents more or less 
the same conclusions as the research done on his own behalf by the Centro de Estudios 
Publicos in Chile.
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as valuing an entrepreneurial spirit’.93 Especially in stable, democratic, high-
trust countries like Finland the promotion of such values promises material 
success. However, he adds that ‘those who have already achieved relative suc-
cess, might, at some point, begin to feel the need for a less pressing theological 
approach’.94 Within an already secularised society this may easily lead to rapid 
secularisation after the first generation of immigrants. So, another avenue for 
future research may lie in the possible secularisation of African youth in the 
cities of the West.
5 Conclusions
Christian revivals seem to take off most convincingly in contexts of beginning 
industrialisation and urbanisation, among populations who share the basic 
tenets of Christian cosmology.95 In such contexts the older religious system — 
rooted in collective patterns around agricultural (hacienda) life — comes 
under tension to the point of breaking, but at the same time it still contains 
enough resources to renew itself and to become the inspirational force for new 
generations. Thus, Christianity can be ‘re-vived’, but in a different form, geared 
to the needs of a different environment. In this way it creates social capital 
where none existed, and it motivates and sustains a labour force which — 
at least in Latin America — shifts ‘from being pre-modern to post-industrial 
often in one traumatic step’.96
While revivalistic Christianity, especially Pentecostalism, seems to lead 
a certain number of its adherents into a post-Christian (or at least a post-
church) life in Latin America, it is still unclear to what extent this is happening 
in Africa. Admittedly, there are clear indications of secularisation among the 
educated elite and the wealthy urban minorities, and there are some attempts 
to differentiate church and state, but it is unclear to what extent this is related 
to revivalism. However, there are unequivocal tendencies towards the creation 
of ‘buffered selves’ in African revivalism, especially in Pentecostalism’s empha-
sis on individualism, self-management and an entrepreneurial spirit. Also, its 
rather instrumental view of religion in the service of gaining earthly goods may 
93   Mika Vähäkangas, “The Prosperity Gospel in the African Diaspora: Unethical Theology or 
Gospel in Context?”, Exchange 44 (2015), 370.
94   Vähäkangas, “The Prosperity Gospel”, 378.
95   Andrew F. Walls, “The Eighteenth Century Protestant Missionary Awakening in Its 
European Context”, in Christian Missions and the Enlightenment, ed. Brian Stanley (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 22-44, esp. 41.
96   Martin, Pentecostalism, 81-82.
Downloaded from Brill.com11/13/2020 10:27:49AM
via Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
50 Paas
Exchange 48 (2019) 26-50
form a context for secularisation eventually, once these goods are achieved. 
Finally, the constant pressure from Pentecostal preachers on their members 
and their high demands in terms of money and time, seems to push a consider-
able number of people to other churches or outside the church at all.
On the other hand, African Pentecostalism is thoroughly enchanted, even 
though this enchantment may be interpreted as a transitory phenomenon in 
the processes of urbanisation, modernisation and industrialisation. Admitted-
ly, some structural features that have caused secularisation in the West are in 
place, or are beginning to take shape, such as an increasing number of ‘nones’, 
growing unbelief among some sub-groups such as wealthy urban elites, more 
public voices of atheists and agnostics, nations that separate church and state, 
disappointment with the behaviour of church leaders and changing patterns 
of family life. As far as I can tell there is no reason to assume that Africans 
are different from other people in that they are somehow immune to a secu-
lar worldview. On the other hand, the connection between ‘Africanness’ and 
‘religion’, the immense vitality of grassroots’ religiosity in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and the relative lack of credible non-religious alternatives are strong buffers 
against secularisation. At least, for now.
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